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                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-2448 
____________ 
 
ROBERT WEAVER, 
 
                                                                Appellant 
 
v.  
 
LAURA BEVERIDGE; BETTY WEAVER; JAMES REEDER 
 
       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. No. 1-09-cv-02357) 
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
       
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on March 7, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed August 27, 2014) 
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Robert Weaver appeals the District Court’s April 18, 2013, order granting 
summary judgment in favor of defendant Laura Beveridge.  We will affirm. 
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I. Background 
 On June 25, 2002, Loretta Nispel reported to the York City Police Department that 
she had been sexually assaulted by her stepbrother, plaintiff Robert Weaver, and her 
father, Robert Weaver, Sr.  Detective Laura Beveridge was assigned to investigate the 
case. 
 Nispel, who has developmental disabilities and has some difficulty 
communicating, alleged that the incident occurred in December 2001.  Beveridge first 
interviewed Nispel on July 16, 2002.  Nispel told Beveridge that she was with plaintiff, 
Weaver, Sr., and Weaver, Sr.’s, wife, Betty Weaver, at plaintiff’s home.  Betty Weaver 
then left the residence for several hours.  Nispel alleged that the assault occurred while 
Betty Weaver was absent. 
 Beveridge’s investigation included additional interviews with Nispel and other 
witnesses, including Betty Weaver; Steve Cochran, Nispel’s then-boyfriend; and Eleanor 
Coxen, Nispel’s mother.  During one interview, Beveridge drew some pictures to help 
Nispel identify where and how plaintiff and Weaver, Sr., touched and assaulted her.  
Nispel also underwent a medical examination, but the examination, which occurred many 
months after the alleged incident, was inconclusive. 
 Assistant District Attorney (ADA) James Reeder was assigned to prosecute the 
case.  Plaintiff was tried in July 2003 and convicted of multiple charges. 
 Weaver filed three petitions under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act, 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541 et seq.  His third petition under the PCRA was denied by 
the trial court, but granted on appeal by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on Weaver’s 
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claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial counsel’s failure to call Betty 
Weaver and Lakeisha Weaver, plaintiff’s daughter, as witnesses.  The Commonwealth’s 
appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the case was remanded for a 
new trial in February 2009. 
 On remand, the case was assigned to ADA Christopher Moore.  Moore spoke with 
Nispel and her mental-health case worker and was informed that Nispel’s life was 
improving.  Weaver had served nearly six years in prison.  Moore decided to file a nolle 
prosequi of the criminal charges for two reasons:  he wanted to avoid putting Nispel 
through another trial and he thought Weaver was not likely to receive additional jail time 
if convicted.  Weaver was released from York County Prison in February 2009. 
 On December 1, 2009, plaintiff brought various claims in the U.S. District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Beveridge, Reeder, and Betty Weaver.  
The only remaining claim
1
 is against Beveridge for malicious prosecution under the 
Fourth Amendment brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment for Beveridge because of Weaver’s failure to meet the favorable 
termination requirement of a malicious prosecution claim.  Weaver v. Beveridge, No. 09-
2357, 2013 WL 1686630 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2013).  Weaver appealed.
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1
 The claims against Reeder were dismissed pursuant to a motion to dismiss and were not 
appealed.  The claims against Betty Weaver, who has died, were voluntarily dismissed. 
2
 Weaver asserts in his notice of appeal that he is appealing from various orders entered 
in the District Court.  However, the “argument” section of Weaver’s opening brief 
challenges only the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Beveridge.  
To the extent that Weaver purports to appeal from the other rulings, he runs afoul of 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A), which requires that the “argument” 
section of an appellant’s brief contain “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, 
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II. Discussion
3
 
 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
Inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
587 (1986).  “We exercise de novo review of the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment.”  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 A malicious prosecution action under section 1983, for violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, requires that (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding, (2) the 
proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor, (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without 
probable cause, (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing 
the plaintiff to justice, and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with 
the concept of seizure as a consequence of the legal proceeding.  Johnson v. Knorr, 477 
F.3d 77, 82–83 (3d Cir. 2007).  Failure to meet any element is fatal to the claim.  Kossler 
v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 Assuming, arguendo, that Weaver can show a genuine issue of material fact on the 
other elements, the District Court held that his claim still failed because he did not 
                                                                                                                                                  
with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.”  
Fed. R.A.P. 28(a)(8)(A); see also L.A.R. 28.3(a).  Therefore, Weaver has waived any 
claim of error with respect to those other rulings.  Weaver has similarly waived his 
proposed “Questions Presented” – i.e., whether Weaver was denied procedural due 
process, access to the courts, or his right to confrontation – by failing to raise arguments 
related to those issues as well.     
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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present  any evidence that would meet the favorable termination requirement.  To meet 
that requirement, “a prior criminal case must have been disposed of in a way that 
indicates the innocence of the accused.”  Id. at 187.  The plaintiff’s innocence may be 
shown if his criminal proceeding was terminated by a discharge by a magistrate at a 
preliminary hearing, the refusal of a grand jury to indict, the formal abandonment of the 
proceedings by the public prosecutor, the quashing of an indictment or information, an 
acquittal, or a final order in favor of the accused by a trial or appellate court.  Id.  A grant 
of nolle prosequi can be sufficient to satisfy the favorable termination requirement, but 
“not all cases where the prosecutor abandons criminal charges are considered to have 
terminated favorably.”  Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, a nolle prosequi indicates termination of the charges in 
favor of the accused “only when their final disposition is such as to indicate the 
innocence of the accused.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 The record shows that ADA Moore chose not to retry Weaver because he felt it 
was unlikely that Weaver would serve additional time and Moore did not want to make 
Nispel go through another trial.  There is no evidence suggesting that the decision not to 
retry Weaver was taken because Weaver was believed to be innocent.  This case is 
similar to Donahue, where the decision not to retry was based on the unlikelihood of 
additional jail time and preservation of prosecutorial resources without any indication 
that Donahue was thought to be innocent.  See id. at 384.  Weaver may not rely on his 
conclusory allegation, unsupported by any record evidence, that the grant of nolle 
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prosequi was because of his innocence.  See Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark v. DuFresne, 
676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court did not err in granting summary 
judgment for defendant Beveridge.  We will affirm the District Court’s order. 
